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I. INTRODUCTION / OVERVIEW  
A. PROBLEM  
Terrorists around the world have been active for many years, but until September 
11, 2001, counter efforts within the United States were minimal. Following those attacks, 
however, the U.S. learned that a wide variety of issues must be addressed by a multitude 
of organizations and individuals to achieve the level of protection necessary to secure our 
homeland. Most important among these is the need for information – our first line of 
defense. Essential to this endeavor is the collection of information (from all sources), 
analysis of the information to develop actionable intelligence, and sharing of the 
intelligence across jurisdictional and disciplinary lines.  
While the federal government continues its effort to improve the system for 
access to information and broader dissemination, local regions are not waiting for 
instructions from Washington, D.C. Many areas have already implemented initiatives to 
improve information sharing. The pitfall with this approach is the potential that each of 
these groups will be acting independently of one another and without connectivity to a 
larger network. A study conducted by the General Accounting Office (GAO) concluded 
that these efforts are not well coordinated, risk duplication of effort, and may not include 
all of the agencies that need access to information (GAO 2003, 11).   
According to the report, a number of these individual efforts have been designated 
as a “best practice.” However, this labeling has occurred largely by perception or self 
proclamation, with no formal validation. There is little evidence to substantiate the 
effectiveness of intelligence sharing initiatives because they currently lack specific 
performance measures that could determine the effectiveness of a program to meet its 
intended goals/objectives.  
 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF RESEARCH 
This thesis will provide a programmatic example that can serve as a forerunner 
for meeting a portion of the requirements contained in Homeland Security Presidential 
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Directive 8 and the Interim National Preparedness Goal. On December 17, 2003, the 
President issued HSPD 8 to: 
…establish policies to strengthen the preparedness of the United States to 
prevent and respond to threatened or actual domestic terrorist attacks, 
major disasters, and other emergencies by requiring a national domestic 
all-hazards preparedness goal, establishing mechanisms for improved 
delivery of Federal preparedness assistance to State and local 
governments, and outlining actions to strengthen preparedness capabilities 
of Federal, State, and local entities. (HSPD-8, 2003). 
HSPD 8 requires the development of standards and metrics to assess capability, 
performance and overall preparedness of a jurisdiction or group of jurisdictions. 
Standards and metrics are being developed or modified in collaboration with appropriate 
stakeholders to measure outcomes (i.e., availability, efficiency, and effectiveness) and 
ensure that all elements of capability (e.g., personnel, planning, organization and 
leadership, equipment, training, and exercises, evaluations, and corrective actions) are 
considered (HSPD-8, 2003).  
The Interim National Preparedness Goal establishes the national vision and 
priorities that will guide the efforts to strengthen the Nation’s preparedness while 
measurable readiness benchmarks and targets are being set.  
Two components of the Interim Goal are the Uniform Task List (UTL), which describes 
tasks that may need to be performed, and a Target Capabilities List (TCL) that details 
what capabilities entities will be expected to develop and maintain. There is also a 
requirement to include performance measures and criteria associated with each task. The 
TCL is comprised of 36 measures and criteria. Five of these areas, Critical Infrastructure 
Protection, Information Collection and Threat Recognition, Information Sharing and 
Collaboration, Intelligence Fusion and Analysis, and Terrorism Investigation and 
Intervention will be addressed in this thesis.  
A description of the Los Angeles Terrorism Early Warning (TEW) Group is 
currently posted on the Lessons Learned Information Sharing website, LLIS.gov, which 
is sponsored by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. It is currently classified as a 
“good story,” which means that it is considered an exemplary, but not (peer) validated 
program. The results of the research contained in this thesis will be provided to LLIS.gov  
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for posting. This will serve to update the status of the TEW classification as well as 
provide an example of a means to comply with the requirements of HSPD-8 and the 
Interim National Preparedness Goal.  
 
C. HYPOTHESIS 
The objective of my thesis is to apply a process to assess the effectiveness of the 
Los Angeles TEW in order to validate it as a smart practice, with the intention of setting a 
benchmark of standards for a national model. This can be accomplished by verifying the 
links between the assumptions on which the program is based and actual program 
activities. The ultimate goal is to establish guidelines for standardized collaborative 
intelligence sharing operations, through the Los Angeles TEW example, that can be 




While the Los Angeles Terrorism Early Warning (TEW) Group has been in 
operation for eight years, the program’s outcomes have never been formally measured to 
validate its performance expectations. This research is intended to serve as a basis for 
evaluating regional collaborative intelligence operations, and to establish a standard for 
similar programs to be measured against. 
The effectiveness of the Los Angeles Terrorism Early Warning (TEW) Group will 
be measured through an application of a Program Logic Model (Kellogg Foundation 
2001). This method of evaluation serves to clarify the links between the assumptions a 
program is based on, the program’s actual activities, and the desired intermediate and 
long-term outcomes (Hass and Springer 1998, 34). The logic model can provide an 
understanding of what actually happens in a specific program, and it is an important tool 
for identifying the components needed for replication (Pumariega 1996). The Program 
Logic Model offers an effective means to evaluate a program while documenting what 
works and why. 
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E. SYNOPSIS OF CHAPTERS 
1. Chapter I – Introduction/Overview 
It is widely believed that information is the most powerful weapon we have at our 
disposal to combat the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). However, without an 
integrated and standardized network to share that information, our nation is left only with 
a multitude of classic “stovepipe” operations. This lack of integration results in the 
opposite effect of the popular phrase “connecting the dots,” and enables independent 
entities to possess potentially vital bits of intelligence in a vacuum. The solution lies 
beyond merely placing representatives from different agencies (and sometimes 
disciplines) together in a facility and calling it a “fusion center.”  There must be a 
standardized system to process information across jurisdictional and disciplinary 
boundaries. This will create a structure that can provide a template for replication in other 
regions that will result in the formation of a nationwide network. The opportunity to 
actually achieve the goal of a fully integrated intelligence fusion center is within reach, 
but it requires the cooperative effort of the major stakeholders in homeland security.  
While a number of intelligence fusion programs have been established, there is a 
lack of research to validate their efficiency and effectiveness. This thesis will provide a 
detailed description of a model program, and through the identification and application of 
a performance measure evaluation tool, will validate its effectiveness and label as a “best 
practice.”  
 
2. Chapter II – Survey of Related Documents 
This chapter explores the relevant research on information and intelligence 
sharing operations, primarily as evaluated by a number of commissions and government 
sponsored reports. These documents identify current deficiencies and desired attributes of 
collaborative information sharing efforts. They also look at a variety of performance 
measurement tools as a means to determine results and efficiency of programs. This 
differs from typical program evaluations that provide information on outcomes but ignore 
the linkage between activities and results. This chapter also contains references to studies 
on the evaluation of “best practices.”   
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3. Chapter III – Methodology – The Logic Model 
This chapter explores the range of approaches that exist for evaluating results 
management. A variety of models are identified and briefly described. The Program 
Logic Model is selected as the most fitting tool to apply to the information sharing 
process known as the Terrorism Early Warning (TEW) Group. The Program Logic 
Model includes specific steps to assess the full range of the program, from inputs to 
impact. A detailed assessment will be completed by applying the metrics of the logic 
model to each of the six cells of the TEW, and then to its overall integrated process  
 
4. Chapter IV - The Terrorism Early Warning (TEW) Group 
This chapter covers the history and development, and provides a detailed 
description of the TEW and its organizational components. It lays the foundation for 
understanding its purpose, process, goals and objectives, which is essential in 
determining if the TEW produces the expected and intended outcomes.  
 
5. Chapter V- The Logic Model Applied to the Components of the TEW 
In this chapter, each of the six cells of the TEW will be measured according to the 
criteria of the Program Logic Model. This includes the inputs, activities, outputs, and 
outcomes of each of the components as they relate to the internal TEW process. 
 
6. Chapter VI - Performance of the TEW Model /Process 
This chapter evaluates the proficiency and performance of the entire TEW 
process. Once each of the cells have been individually evaluated, it is essential to assess 
the overall program to determine its effectiveness. This will entail an assessment of all 
inter-cell activities in a cumulative appraisal of the phases of the logic model as it applies 
to the process  
 
7. Chapter VII – Conclusion and Recommendation for Further 
Research 
This chapter will provide a conclusion that addresses the thesis question, 
Perception or Fact: Does the measurement of the effectiveness of the Los Angeles 
Terrorism Early Warning Group validate its label as a “best practice”? Therefore, will its 
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replication across the nation form the type of intelligence network that is necessary to 
defend the nation against threats of terrorism? This chapter will also recommend further 
research, based on the outcome of this analysis, to measure the effectiveness of the 




II. SURVEY OF RELATED DOCUMENTS 
In order to fully assess the effectiveness of an operational program, it is necessary 
to look beyond references that merely describe its activities. Evaluation of the process 
and results is equally important, as is the ability to gain an overall perspective of 
homeland security issues from the national to local levels.  
A thorough overview of homeland security issues is addressed in the annual 
reports of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism 
Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (1999, 2000, and 2002) and the reports of the 
Markle Foundation Task Force (2002 and 2003), which essentially evaluate all aspects of 
our nation’s readiness. These include some of the characteristics of information sharing 
and collaborative efforts. A third report, prepared by the General Accounting Office 
(GAO) for the Secretary of Homeland Security, “Homeland Security – Efforts to Improve 
Information Sharing Need to be Strengthened” (2003), addresses this specific issue.  
In his work on the study of smart practices, Eugene Bardach suggests that, 
“Rarely will you have any confidence that some helpful-looking practice is actually the 
‘best’ among all those that are addressed to the same problem. Usually, you will be 
looking for what, more modestly, might be called ‘good’ practices” (Bardach 2000, 71). 
He actually prefers the term “smart practice,” because it has something worth analyzing 
that is applicable to the problem at hand. 
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s Lessons Learned Information 
Sharing website also addresses the issue of “best practices.” It labels programs as 
“Lessons Learned,” “Good Stories” or “Best Practices” according to the following 
criteria: (www.LLIS.gov).  
Lesson Learned is knowledge and experience—positive or negative—
derived from actual incidents such as the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing 
and the 9/11 attacks as well as observations and historical study of 
operations, training, and exercises. 
Good Stories are exemplary—but non-peer-validated—initiatives 
implemented by various jurisdictions that have shown success in their 
specific environments and that may provide useful information to other 
communities and organizations. 
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Best Practice is a peer-validated technique, procedure, good idea, or 
solution that works and is solidly grounded upon actual experience in 
operations, training, and exercises. 
Peer-validated content: All Lessons Learned and Best Practices are peer-
validated. These resources have been conceived and developed by 
homeland security professionals for their peers.  
These definitions refer to peer validation and successful stories that are based 
primarily on anecdotal information. Particularly in the “Best Practice” category, neither 
peer validation nor success is based on specific measurable criteria. It appears that the 
findings are largely based on the perception of the participants. I intend to submit the 
results discovered through the application of legitimate performance measures in my 
thesis to this website. This will serve to validate the effectiveness of the Los Angeles 
TEW to meet its intended goals. 
In addition to government publications about information sharing efforts, the Los 
Angeles TEW has been mentioned in academic research. An example can be found in the 
NPS Thesis, “Reforming Counterintelligence in the Wake of 9/11,” which states that   
….One of the earliest and best examples in developing a counterterrorism 
support network that pre-dates 9/11 is the Los Angeles Terrorism Early 
Warning Group (TEW). To the author’s knowledge there does not appear 
to be any historical example or case where U.S. counterintelligence 
functioned in such a distributed, networked and collaborative fashion 
(Gleghorn 2003, 83). 
The TEW is based on a systems concept. The definition that best fits its model is, 
“a group of interacting, interrelated, or interdependent elements forming a complex 
whole.” It is, “a condition of harmonious, orderly interaction, [and] an organized and 
coordinated method” (dictionary.com 2005).   
Protecting our country against acts of terrorism requires an effective, integrated 
network for security and defense. It is the most effective means to combat the networked 
adversary that we now face. This has become evident from the number of violent terrorist 
acts that have occurred throughout the world, clearly indicating that the enemy is no 
longer a nation state that our military can substantially overpower.  
In addition to creating a systems approach in response to this new kind of threat, 
the TEW was also developed as a network with a concept and structure similar to that 
described in Network and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime and Militancy (RAND 
2001). In this, and previous work, Arqilla and Ronfeldt describe three types of networks 
that have become apparent in the organizational structures of netwar actors.1 They are 
defined as follows and depicted in Figure 1 (RAND 2001): 
• The chain network, as in a smuggling chain where people, goods, or 
information move along a line of separated contacts, and where end-to-end 
communication must travel through the intermediate nodes. 
• The star, hub, or wheel network, as in a franchise or a cartel structure 
where a set of actors is tied to a central node or actor, and must go through 
that node to communicate and coordinate. 
• The all-channel network, as in a collaborative network of militant small 
groups where every group is connected to every other. 
 
Figure 1.   Three Basic Types of Networks (From RAND) 
 
Arquilla et al suggest that no one type is exclusively used by any particular group. 
In fact, there are hybrids that combine two or more depending upon the intended 
application. These networks are not unique to “netwar” actors alone. They represent the 
type of arrangements that exist in the global terrorist movement in general. The 
application of a similar construct of the TEW enables an expanded reach of public safety 
intelligence collection because it allows for a deviation from the traditional bureaucratic 
“chain of command” that usually constrains the flow of information.  
The significance of the network structure and its future impact on homeland 
security is best described as follows:  
                                                 
1 The term netwar was coined by Arquilla and Ronfeldt in 1993 “largely because… the information 
revolution favored network forms of organization, doctrine, and strategy.”  
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The rise of networks means that power is migrating to nonstate actors, 
because they are able to organize into sprawling multi-organizational 
networks (especially “all-channel” networks, in which every node is 
connected to every other node) more readily than can traditional, 
hierarchical, state actors. This implies that conflicts will be increasingly 
waged by “networks,” perhaps more than by “hierarchies.” It also means 
that whoever masters the network form stands to gain the advantage 
(Ronfeldt and Arquilla 2001). 
The GAO has looked at a number of programs and is particularly interested in the 
Terrorism Early Warning (TEW) Group in Los Angeles County as a potential model for 
coordinating regional information sharing programs. This initiative came to its attention 
from several sources. In 2000, the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism 
(MIPT) first identified the Los Angeles TEW as a model to be replicated in other regions 
in the country. This was based on the Los Angeles area case study reported in the 
Gilmore Commission’s Second Annual Report, which stated that the commission 
believes that: 
…the lessons learned in Los Angeles are relevant to jurisdictions 
nationwide and that the federal government can 1) aid in the dissemination 
of the lessons learned in Los Angeles; and 2) participate in educating 
agencies at all levels of government in the effective use of the 
methodologies employed in Los Angeles to draw relevant conclusions and 
turn them into practice (Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response 
Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction 
[Gilmore Commission] 2000, Appendix G). 
In 2002, the Department of Homeland Security’s Office for Domestic 
Preparedness (ODP) also cited the Los Angeles TEW as a model for replication. This was 
based on the fact that the TEW is a full-time, multi-agency, multi-disciplinary (law, fire 
and health) and multi-jurisdictional (local, state and federal) operational entity that 
addresses all phases (pre, trans and post) of a terrorist threat or incident.   
The question that remains unanswered is: does the LA TEW work?  Although 
prevention is difficult to measure in any program, input and outcome are assessable. The 
aspects that need to be considered are strategic planning, performance measures and a 
suitable process to evaluate a collaborative program.   
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Strategic planning is related to outcomes. A program should have a clear mission 
and a vision of success. The mission outlines the organization’s purpose while a vision 
describes how the successful organization should look (Bryson 1995, 155). This is 
illustrated in the federal Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA), a 
traditional results management approach which requires all federal agencies to produce a 
strategic plan based on outcomes.  
Performance measures provide a means to determine results (outcomes) and 
efficiency so the services or programs can be compared to their intended purpose (Hatry 
1999). A range of approaches exists for evaluating results management. These include the 
following models: traditional, program logic, risk management, scenario-based planning, 
managing to standards and capabilities-based planning and assessment (Caudle 2004, 5). 
An additional measurement can be accomplished by applying the evaluation tools 
developed to assess an actual program operation. The availability of after-action reports 
(AAR), which are prepared to determine the successes and failures of an event, can 
provide a sound resource for this purpose. The results will therefore be based on fact and 
not perception or a self-proclamation of success.  
The self-proclamation of “best practice” comes without validation. It is therefore 
important to determine if minimum requirements or acceptable standards have been 
established for these information sharing, or fusion center operations. It would also be 
interesting to note if other organizations exist that are attempting similar efforts. The 
process to accomplish this objective is known as benchmarking (Trimble 2005, 2). It is 
useful for determining how like organizations are effectively accomplishing similar tasks 
and goals, and then comparing their achievements to those of your own operations. It is a 
way to look at “best practices” as a means of identifying gaps and improving 
performance. As the requirements for national security and the need for local intelligence 
are still in the developmental stages for most domestic law enforcement agencies, an 
ongoing benchmarking plan can still be implemented that will increase the effectiveness 
of the effort as it continues to evolve.  
There are currently two primary sources that exist for this type of information. 
Much work has been done by government organizations to identify standards for fusion 
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center operations and best practices. The Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) in the 
Department of Justice has published a (draft) report entitled Recommended Fusion Center 
Standards – Developing and Sharing Intelligence in a New World (BJA 2005). It contains 
17 items that are considered to be minimum requirements for establishing an effective 
fusion center operation. The Lessons Learned Information Sharing (LLIS.gov) website 
publication Best Practices: Local Anti-Terrorism Information and Intelligence Sharing 
offers several documents that contain recommendations for key elements of successful 
best practices, with actual examples. Both of these reports were produced with input from 
working groups comprised of subject matter experts from all levels of public safety 
agencies. The BJA report provides what is needed, while the LLIS.gov postings say how 
to accomplish the desired results. The TEW meets or exceeds all of the desirable traits 
identified in both of the documents, and was in fact specifically cited multiple times in 
the LLIS.gov literature as the pioneering and model operation.  
Although the L.A. TEW has been labeled as a “Best Practice” by the government 
groups cited, there are still no standards to measure it against or to substantiate what 
components make up a successful system for intelligence fusion and dissemination. The 
ideal model will meet the needs of the nation as well as serve the local area. It is believed 
that the L.A. TEW is this model; however, appropriate performance measures need to be 
implemented to validate what is now only perception. 
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III. METHODOLOGY – THE LOGIC MODEL 
Performance measures differ from typical program evaluations normally 
undertaken by government agencies, such as the GPRA process, that provide information 
on outcomes but little evidence on the causal linkage between activities and results. A 
range of approaches exists for evaluating results management. These include the 
following models: traditional, program logic, risk management, scenario-based planning, 
managing to standards, and capabilities-based planning and assessment (Caudle 2004, 5). 
Each of these methods has a primary objective in measuring effectiveness. For instance, 
the traditional model focuses on setting goals, objectives, strategies and measures, which 
can be used for strategic planning efforts for an organization. The program logic model 
describes a conversion of inputs to impacts of specific programs. The risk management 
model is utilized by an organization for analysis and decision making to achieve an 
acceptable level of risk. A scenario-based planning approach identifies possible future 
events and creates courses of action to address the anticipated circumstances. Managing 
to standards provide a way to assess achievement based on a uniform set of specifications 
that provide a benchmark for performance. Unfortunately, at this point in the 
development of our homeland security efforts, standards have yet to be established for 
intelligence fusion center operations such as the TEW. The last approach is the 
capabilities-based planning and assessment model. This process serves to identify 
capabilities to accomplish specific missions. This is the method that has been 
implemented by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security to define national 
preparedness goals and standards required by HSPD 8. It includes the 15 scenarios 
(missions) that DHS has utilized to determine what communities will need to do to be 
prepared and capable of responding to the identified hazards. Although this is not 
specifically scenario based, it has essentially combined the two approaches.  
As seen with the DHS example, the methods are not mutually exclusive and can 
be used separately or in combination. While the scenario-based planning approach has 
some application for measurement of the TEW, it is limited to the response phase for 
course of action development for future events. This is only a portion of what the TEW 
does. Likewise, the scenario-based approach has limits in terms of the scope of an 
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anticipated event. The method of attack on September 11, 2001 was certainly not 
expected, therefore, preparedness for this specific type of incident was limited. The TEW 
is concerned with all aspects, types and phases of terrorism, from prevention to recovery. 
Therefore, the program logic model appears to be the most suitable for its measurement 
of effectiveness because it is can be tailored to be inclusive of all aspects of the 
intelligence fusion process. In addition, while it is difficult to measure prevention, the 
tangible evaluation of outcomes and impact of a program, which is not the primary focus 
of the other models, can certainly yield strong indications of success.     
One of the most attractive attributes of using the Program Logic Model for 
measuring the performance of the TEW process is that it serves as a visualization tool to 
evaluate and improve program effectiveness at all stages. “The ability to visualize the 
entire scope of the problem and recognize the interconnection of seemingly disassociated 
factors is what empowers strategic planners with the ability to anticipate threats, 
determine consequence, and envisage response alternatives” (Campbell 2005). The logic 
model process is a tool that has been used by evaluators for many years to identify 
performance measures and describe the effectiveness of programs. The model and its 
process was provided to its grantees in the W.K. Kellogg Foundation Evaluation 
Handbook in 1998 as a means of “…facilitating thinking, planning, and communications 
about program objectives and actual accomplishments.” This model describes logical 
linkages among program resources, activities, outputs, audiences, and short-, 
intermediate-, and long-term outcomes related to a specific problem or situation (Millar 
et al. 2001, 73).  
The Program Logic Model includes specific steps of assessment that range from 
inputs to impact of a program. It is a “systematic and visual way to present and share 
your understanding of the relationships among the resources you have to operate your 
program, the activities you plan to do, and the changes or results you hope to achieve” 
(Kellogg Foundation 2001).  
 
The five steps of the Program Logic Model are: 
1. Inputs – the personnel, equipment and organizational resources dedicated to the 
program. 
2. Activities – the processes, techniques and actions of the program. 
 
3. Outputs – the direct results of the program activities (i.e., the scope of services 
and products delivered). 
 
4. Outcomes – specific changes in program participant’s knowledge, skills and level             
       of functioning.  
 
5.  Impact – the changes or results that are realized from program outputs and            
      outcomes (e.g., improved conditions, increased awareness). 
 
When depicted as a graphic illustration, it is read from left to right, which 
describes the program basics over time, from planning through results. “Reading a logic 
model means following the chain of reasoning of “If...then...” statements which connect 
the program’s parts” (Kellogg 2001). Figure 2 shows how the basic logic model is read. 
 
Figure 2.   How to read a logic model (From Kellogg 2001) 
 
The objective of this thesis is to dissect the TEW system and apply the process of 
its individual elements, or cells, into the logic model. The same evaluation will then be 
applied to the entire TEW. This method will serve to evaluate the interaction among its 
component parts and determine if the TEW meets its program goals.  
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The TEW is an intelligence fusion operation that is comprised of six cells that 
make up the “Net Assessment Group,” which processes information for analysis and 
dissemination (outputs, outcomes and impact). These cells are briefly described as 
follows:2
 
1. Officer in Charge (OIC)/Command – oversees the TEW process and links with 
the Unified Command.3  
 
2. Analysis / Synthesis – oversee intake and processing of information to and      
 from the other cells, and develops courses of action from intelligence.  
 
3. Consequence Management - assesses law enforcement, fire service and health  
 consequences of events.  
 
4. Investigative Liaison – coordinates with local, state and federal investigation and 
 intelligence teams.  
 
5. Epidemiological Intelligence – responsible for ongoing disease surveillance, 
 food and water surety, agricultural threats, and coordination of disease 
 investigations. 
 
6. Forensic Intelligence Support – provides technical support, chemical, biological, 
radiological and nuclear (CBRN) reconnaissance and geospatial intelligence. Acts 
as liaison to subject matter experts. 
The activities of each of the TEW cells will be applied to the steps of the Program 
Logic Model to determine if the inputs result in the desired or expected outcomes. In 
order to achieve a complete evaluation, the same standard must be applied to each cell of 
the TEW individually, and then to the overall program in a cumulative evaluation, which 
 
2 The entire TEW model and its functions will be described in detail in Chapter IV. 
3 Unified Command consists of the managers from multiple agencies that have the decision making 
authority and are in charge of an incident. 
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will include key inter-cell activities. Once this has been completed, the results will be 
compared with the After Action Report (AAR) for an actual scenario as processed by the 
TEW. A review of the TEW AAR for the 2000 Democratic National Convention in Los 
Angeles, according to the process of the program logic model, can help determine the 
true effectiveness of the TEW. The results of this comparison are intended to confirm the 
data as applied to actual incidents. 
There are multiple adaptations of the logic model, and no one version is 
considered the best. The Kellogg manual indicates that they “come in as many sizes and 
shapes as the programs they represent” Their advice is, “don’t hesitate to experiment with 
program logic model design to determine what works best for your program. And don’t 
be concerned if your model doesn’t look like one of the case examples” (Kellogg 2001). 
In his work, Guidelines and Framework for Designing Basic Logic Model, McNamara 
states, “Logic models can be in regard to what ever application in which the designer 
chooses to use them” (McNamara 2004). 
With this in mind, I will adapt the traditional content of the input component of 
the logic model to better fit the parameters of this study. The conventional elements of 
input for the TEW remain consistent for the overall process and are still pertinent to 
producing the desired results. These are the personnel, equipment and resources 
necessary to accomplish all of the tasks to meet the objectives of the TEW process. The 
staffing includes administrative support, criminal, strategic and intelligence analysts 
(with multi-lingual capability), law enforcement investigators, fire service personnel, 
health and medical personnel (from public health and emergency medical services), and 
specialists in hazardous materials, explosives and forensics (criminalists). Other 
resources include advanced technology in computer hardware and software, 
communications equipment for both classified and unclassified information, and secure 
office space and storage for sensitive materials. 
In this thesis, I will tailor the input content to describe the TEW’s organizational 
structure as an intelligence fusion operation. Instead of physical resources as previously 
described, I will depict input as information, as it represents the beginning step in the 
TEW information analysis and synthesis process. 
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This thesis will address one of the questions posed in the Naval Postgraduate 
School paper Homeland Security: Approaches to Results Management (Caudle 2004), 
which describes a need for future research on this subject by asking the question, “Can 
the ‘best’ of these approaches be melded into a new analytical framework that can be 
used in an individual organization and with others who must contribute to homeland 
security performance? If so, what would that approach look like?”  





“Let me say a word about your Terrorism Early Warning Group. It is a model for 
other cities and states.” Secretary Tom Ridge4   
While the vast majority of citizens failed to recognize the threat posed to our 
national security by terrorist acts around the globe, two deputies from the Los Angeles 
County Sheriff’s Department were paying attention. As John Sullivan and Larry Richards 
observed some of the noteworthy events from 1995 to 1998, their concern grew along 
with the increase in global terrorism. With incidents such as the first World Trade Center 
bombing in New York City in 1993, the sarin gas attack in the Tokyo subway and the 
Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, there appeared to be an emerging trend. Then in 1996, 
a little known Islamist radical named Osama bin Laden issued a “fatwa” urging his 
followers to conduct global terrorist attacks against the United States and its citizens. The 
trend continued with bin Laden’s affirmation of his intent to attack the United States and 
their interests around the world during an ABC news interview with the radical leader in 
May 1998, which was followed by the Khobar Towers incident in Saudi Arabia the 
following month.  
Because terrorism comes from a complex networked threat, the traditional 
hierarchical military structure is largely an ineffective defense. “Combating an agile 
terrorist network requires an equally agile network of government agencies” (Krikorian 
2004). 
Information sharing and intelligence fusion centers, considered to be a necessity 
in the war on terrorism, are being established across the nation. The most effective of 
these efforts, such as the TEW model, include multi-level (local, state and federal) and 
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4 Remarks by Secretary Tom Ridge to LA County first responders, April 24, 2003. 
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multi-disciplinary (law, fire, health and emergency management) participants who can 
blend all perspectives into a complete picture of threat, risk and vulnerability.  
“Sullivan and Richards knew two things: that the only way to deal with a terrorist 
network was to create a counter-terrorism network, and that information sharing among 
agencies would be the key to preventing and reacting to terrorist attacks” (Pilant 2004). 
This method would provide the ability to facilitate both lateral and vertical unrestricted 
communication both within and among agencies. 
The Terrorism Early Warning (TEW) Group was initiated by the Los Angeles 
County Sheriff’s Department in 1996, to fill a void in information and knowledge about 
terrorism. The TEW is a multi-discipline, multi-agency and multi-jurisdictional entity 
with a primary mission/goal of “being the focal point for analyzing the strategic and 
operational information needed to combat terrorism and protect critical infrastructure” 
(U.S.DHS/ODP 2004). It is a regional information collection and sharing (fusion) 
operation that provides indications and warnings of potential terrorist threats, and 
operational net assessment, a process of developing course of action plans for incident 
response. It is based on specific information about the location and mode of attack, 
combined with real-time intelligence.  
The original primary partners in the TEW consisted of representatives from the 
Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department, Los Angeles Police Department, the FBI, the Los 
Angeles County and City Fire Departments and the Los Angeles County Health 
Department (public health and emergency medical services – EMS). Additional 
cooperating agencies included local, state and federal law enforcement, emergency 
management, municipal fire departments, transportation authorities, universities, airports 
and military (National Guard and Coast Guard).  
Initially, L.A. County’s TEW aimed to develop relationships that allowed 
each agency to share information. The TEW’s ultimate goal was to fuse 
different intelligence disciplines, share information, investigate emerging 
threats, create scenarios of different types of attacks, train to respond to 
those attacks, and provide tactical support to responding agencies (Pilant 
2004). 
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Considering the size and complexity of the Los Angeles region, this would be no 
small task. The operational area (county) spans 4,000 square miles, contains 10 million 
people in 88 cities and unincorporated county areas, and has 45 local law enforcement 
agencies, 38 fire departments, three public health agency and 80 hospitals. It is also one 
of the most target rich and vulnerable areas in the nation with the ports of Long Beach 
and Los Angeles, the Los Angeles International Airport (LAX), the entertainment 
industry and a host of other commercial and industrial complexes which include 
aerospace, oil refineries and power plants.   
…Southern California has long had an excellent reputation for emergency 
response agencies that work well together, which is understandable. 
Earthquakes and brush fires, the two most common large-scale 
emergencies here, do tend to cross multiple jurisdictional lines (Bannon 
2002, 30). 
The question of who is in charge was settled early in the development of the TEW 
program. The initial participants decided that no single agency would be in control and 
that a unified command structure would be established. The sheriff’s department agreed 
to act as the secretariat for the organization, which required it to provide the necessary 
logistics support for arranging meetings, training, communicating with the members and 
housing the operation.   
The TEW is comprised of six integrated cells that create a system for processing 
incoming data through analysis by each of the cells, then synthesis of their individual 
evaluation to form an overall picture. The TEW is staffed by individuals and subject 
matter experts from law enforcement, fire and health services who work together to 
develop a complete picture of the current situation as well as an indication of future or 
potential threats. Figure 3 depicts the TEW organizational structure with an explanation 
of each of the cells following: (Sullivan 2005, 14)  
 
Figure 3.   TEW organization (From TEW Guide 2005) 
 
The Officer-in-Charge (OIC) (or Unified Command) provides command, 
direction and supervision, sets intelligence requirements, and is responsible for 
coordination with all local, state and federal agencies.  
Analysis/Synthesis Cell (A/S) -- This is the central integrating hub of the TEW 
organization. This cell tasks out requests for information to other cells, then collects and 
integrates their individual products into a cohesive assessment. This process includes 
capturing investigative information, gathering intelligence from all sources, and 
analyzing and synthesizing it. The A/S cell also synchronizes information from the 
Investigative Liaison, Consequence Management, Epidemiological Intelligence, and the 
Forensic Intelligence Support/Field Assessment Support Team cells into a usable product 
for decision-makers. Products issued by the A/S cell include advisories, alerts, warnings, 
issue-specific white papers, and mission folders. Mission folders integrate threat-specific 
playbooks, venue-specific Response Information Folders (RIF), intelligence information, 
resource information, archival information on technical dimensions of threat agents, 
resource status, and potential course of action for incident mitigation and response. 
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Investigative Liaison Cell (INV-LNO) -- This cell is responsible for processing, 
tracking and collecting criminal and national security intelligence and leads related to 
terrorism. It is the primary point of contact with all classified, national and state 
databases, and with investigative and intelligence efforts at all levels of government. This 
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is the Operational Area/county link with the FBI and other intelligence and investigative 
entities, and the link to the national network of Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF), 
especially the Los Angeles JTTF. The INV-LNO cell is responsible for vetting and 
validating leads, and assessing specific threats. It is also responsible for working with 
other specialized investigative entities to develop a complete intelligence picture.  
Consequence Management Cell (CM) -- This cell is staffed by members of the 
fire service, law enforcement and medical professionals in order to assess, in the event of 
an attack, the current and future resource status, and to marshal specialized resources 
when necessary. Its members act as a technical reference, and develop potential courses 
of action for response to incidents involving chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear 
and large-scale explosives. It develops tactics and estimates logistical requirements for 
initiating and sustaining a comprehensive response to a terrorist attack. This cell also has 
the primary responsibility for developing playbooks and Response Information Folders. 
Epidemiological Intelligence Cell (Epi-Intel) -- This cell integrates disease 
surveillance for all threats (especially biological terrorism). It facilitates the integration of 
public health and law enforcement investigations, provides planning estimates on the 
distribution of casualties and potential quarantine and treatment issues. This cell ensures 
the accurate and complete flow of information during intentional or suspicious outbreaks, 
and conducts continual monitoring for early recognition and warning of biological 
threats. This cell is also responsible for food and water surety and agricultural issues 
(including liaison to the public health community, water districts, USDA, etc.). 
Forensic Intelligence Support (FIS) Cell & and Field Assessment Support Team 
(FAST) -- This cell is responsible for technical support, including field assessment and 
reconnaissance activities for CBRNE events. It supports a multi-agency response with 
specialized detection and sampling equipment, and provides technical assistance and 
specialist advice that enables law enforcement support to the fire services in the event of 
mass casualty/mass decontamination operations. This cell is responsible for geospatial 
intelligence (GEOINT), cyberterrorism issues, and "virtual reachback" to specialists at 
the national laboratories, military and universities. It uses this information to assess a 
situation and to help develop tactical courses of action. FIS/FAST uses various 
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technologies for modeling and simulation of the potential consequences of a terrorist 
event. The Field Assessment Support Team (FAST) is the field component of the FIS 
cell. It sends information from the field to the TEW for analysis. 
A central fusion center, such as the TEW that has just been described, must not 
operate as an independent entity. It needs to act as a focal point for receiving, analyzing 
and disseminating intelligence both laterally and horizontally. Information from the field 
can be as vital as that from the federal or state agencies. A system that provides the 
vehicle to share information with all levels is therefore essential to the success of 
establishing that agile network of government agencies that is desired. In Los Angeles 
County this was accomplished through the creation of the Terrorism Liaison Officer 
(TLO) Program. 
Shortly after the attacks of September 11, 2001, the police chiefs in the South Bay 
mutual aid area of Los Angeles County organized a Terrorism Advisory Group, as an 
effort apart from the existing TEW. One of the concepts that came out of this effort was 
that each agency would designate a TLO. These officers became the central point of 
contact for all terrorism-related information for their respective agencies. This created a 
pathway for information flow and coordination among the participating cities.  
While this was a sound approach to establishing a network for information 
sharing, it had significant limitations; chief among them was that it covered a relatively 
small area of Los Angeles County. This meant that there was neither a formal connection 
to the larger geographic area, nor the ability to see the broader perspective that comes 
from monitoring activities and trends at the state, national or global level. Another 
considerable drawback was that the information sharing effort was exclusive to law 
enforcement.  
Recognizing the extraordinary potential for the TLO Program to be an effective 
force-multiplier for the existing TEW, the concept was expanded countywide. The 
expansion was patterned after the existing mutual-aid structure, which divides the county 
into eight geographic areas. Each area is comprised of multiple departments with one 
acting as the lead agency for its area. The Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department acts 
as the Director of Emergency Operations and the coordinator for law enforcement mutual 
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aid for the operational area (county). Therefore, this existing structure proved beneficial 
for adapting the growing TEW network within the county.  
Using the TEW as the base for an all-source fusion center, TLOs were assigned 
from all local law enforcement agencies, including university, railroad, airport and port 
police departments, as well as the 23 sheriff’s stations (which provide law enforcement 
services for 40 cities), and specialty units (Bomb Detail, Special Enforcement 
Bureau/SWAT, Aero, crime lab and others).  The LAPD, already a full-time partner in 
the TEW, was also included.  
Because the TEW’s multi-disciplinary approach to information sharing is vital to 
the success of any terrorism-related response, the TLO Program was expanded further to 
include representatives from the county’s 38 fire departments. This included multiple 
TLOs from the large county and city fire departments. Representatives from the Los 
Angeles County Department of Health Services and the county’s two other public health 
agencies (Pasadena and Long Beach) were also added. These representatives provide 
field liaison to the full-time fire and health personnel assigned to the Consequence 
Management and the Epidemiological Intelligence sections of the TEW. Currently, there 
are three health service, 50 fire and 204 law enforcement TLOs in Los Angeles County.  
Consistent with the lead-agency format of the mutual aid structure, each of the 
eight geographic areas designated a representative to coordinate information flow 
between the agencies in their areas and the TEW. The fire service arm of the TLO 
Program was set up the same way, with representatives appointed according to its mutual 
aid structure.  
The TLO Program has created a system for lateral and horizontal communication 
with law, fire and health officials, and two-way communication with the TEW. For all its 
seeming complexity, the process is actually quite simple: All leads come in from the field 
for analysis, investigation and deconfliction with multiple agencies, including the FBI, 
Customs, DIA, Secret Service and others. This ensures that all are aware of the 
investigative activities of each of the agencies and can therefore cooperate with any on-
going investigations in the region. With this configuration, smaller municipal agencies,  
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with limited personnel and no active participation in the TEW or JTTF, can still achieve 
full connectivity to the information and resources available at the regional, state and 
federal level.  
The TEW and the TLO Program transcends what was once a fragmented system 
of communication between local and state agencies and the federal intelligence 
community by acting as a regional intelligence fusion center that ensures efficient, 
coordinated information sharing. This structure also provides the avenue to issue 
advisories, alerts or warnings through the TLO network. Therefore, mass notification can 
be accomplished with only a single point of contact to the TEW, which effectively 
relieves DHS, the California Office of Homeland Security (OHS) or the JTTF from the 
difficult task of ensuring that local agencies are promptly notified.  
The TLO Program also provides an expanded network through liaison with the 
private sector and the operators of critical infrastructure facilities. This is accomplished 
through the Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC), which was formed in Los 
Angeles and Orange counties (California State Office of Emergency Services - Region I) 
and is made up of CEOs of major industry. These industry executives and their respective 
security chiefs, who are designated as Infrastructure Liaison Officers (ILO), are linked 
directly to their area TLO to coordinate planning and response to terrorist-related 
incidents at the various facilities and locations in their jurisdiction. These relationships 
are facilitated primarily through subcommittee meetings of representatives from such 
industries as entertainment, real estate, energy and communications/media. 
Few regions in the nation are as large or complex as the Los Angeles area. Many 
other jurisdictions throughout the country, especially the smaller cities and rural areas, 
neither see the need nor have the resources necessary to establish and maintain an 
elaborate intelligence operation like the TEW. Although major identified targets are 
known to be in the metropolitan areas, the terrorist network operates globally and without 
regard to jurisdictional boundaries. In order to have the intelligence network necessary to 
contend with the terrorist threat, we must be able reach out to all parts of our nation. 
Whether or not the operation is full-time, it should include the basic elements of the TEW 
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model. This will ensure that all area jurisdictions, agencies, disciplines and levels are 
included in the information sharing process.  
One way to accomplish this is to establish state and/or regional intelligence fusion 
centers that operate on a full-time basis but with minimum staff.  In this configuration, a 
full-time small scale operation, complimented by a strong TLO network (as collateral 
duty assignments) would be essential in order to maintain contact with the national 
network and keep pace with the lateral and horizontal flow of information. If a threat or 
incident were to occur in the region, a limited or full-scale activation could occur 
instantaneously with complete and current situational awareness. An effective 
organization of this nature would only be possible with full cooperation and prior 
planning among the participating agencies, followed with effective training and exercises.   
Even the original TEW started as an ad hoc group of varied participants that held 
monthly meetings to discuss items of mutual interest and concern related to terrorism. 
The first of these meetings was in October 1996, and they have continued since. 
Representatives from the primary agencies were also activated for special events, such as 
the Democratic National Convention (DNC) in Los Angeles and the Y2K scare. They 
functioned as an operational net assessment group during these periods and then returned 
to their regular assignments and agencies as soon as practical. That is, until September 
11, 2001.  
On that fateful morning, the Undersheriff from the LASD asked the question, 
“What do we do?”5 The answer was immediate. We would activate the TEW to obtain an 
accurate assessment of what had occurred, what we might expect, and how we should 
prepare. This information was then communicated to the public safety agencies and the 
community in the Los Angeles Region. The TEW continued to monitor the situation and 
events from the global, national, state and local perspective on a full-time basis to keep 
the executives in charge apprised of pertinent issues and intelligence information. The 
activation lasted at this level for the next 12 days. A dedicated full-time staff has been 
assigned since that time.6  
 
5 A 0645 PST phone call from Undersheriff William Stonich to (then) Captain Michael Grossman, 
Commander of the Emergency Operations Bureau. 
6 The Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors allocated $1.5 million for a dedicated staff that 
operates on a five day per week schedule with activation on an overtime basis when necessary. 
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As an outgrowth of the TEW, the Joint Regional Intelligence Center (JRIC) 
concept was developed. It brings together all of the appropriate agencies in one location, 
and expands the scope of operations and fully synchronizes intelligence and information 
sharing efforts in the Los Angeles Operational Area. The JRIC will eventually be an all-
crime center with an initial emphasis on terrorist-related criminal intelligence.7 The TEW 
is an embedded component that bridges criminal and operational intelligence for 
terrorism and emerging threats. It provides the link between the intelligence and 
emergency response network with connectivity to all of the law enforcement, fire and 
health agencies in the county via the existing mutual aid structure. Regional connectivity 
to the public safety community and the private sector is facilitated through the Terrorism 
Liaison Officer (TLO) program, the Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC), and 
Private Sector Terrorism Response Group (PSTRG) / Infrastructure Liaison Officer (ILO) 
initiatives.8
The primary partners in this endeavor are the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s 
Department, Los Angeles Police Department, FBI Los Angeles Field Office, United 
States Attorney’s Office for the Central District of California, and the California State 
Department of Justice. Numerous other federal, state and local agencies will also have 
representatives in the center.  
Creating a compatible national intelligence network and avoiding the classic 
stovepipe organization is a challenge that must be met by the federal government. The 
FBI and the Department of Homeland Security are essential partners that need to be 
linked with state and regional centers. “The job of replicating the TEW model throughout 
the nation, thereby creating a national TEW network, has been undertaken by the United 
States Department of Homeland Security’s Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP). The 
TEW Expansion Program provides technical assistance and training, as well as expansion 
workshops for the prospective jurisdictions, and technical assistance and training on 
TEW practice” (Sullivan 2005, 4).   
7 Support for and acts of terrorism most often take the form of traditional crimes. Therefore, all crime 
activity should be analyzed for any nexus to terrorism (e.g. narco-terrorism).   
8 All law enforcement, fire, and health agencies in the Operational Area have a TLO representative to 
the TEW. The HSAC is comprised of CEO’s from major corporations in Los Angeles and Orange Counties 
who act as senior advisors to the Sheriffs. The PSTRG/ILO program connects critical sectors of the 
business community to the intelligence and emergency management structure in the county. 
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Another aspect of the TEW Expansion Program is the establishment of the 
National TEW Resource Center in Los Angeles. The center provides technical assistance 
and training on TEW practice for prospective jurisdictions. Through this effort, ODP has 
essentially identified the TEW model as a benchmark which, “At its core, benchmarking 
aims to boost the performance by stimulating managers to match results achieved in 
comparable or best-performing organizations” (Schick 2001, 47). The benefit of 
replicating this common model is that once the TEW is in place in several locations 
across the country, it will ensure that the assemblage of law enforcement, fire, health and 
emergency management officials from appropriate local, state and federal agencies is 
complete. This affords the ability to share real-time information and intelligence from the 
perspective of all disciplines, laterally and from bottom to top and vice versa.  
That being said, the integration of varied agencies, people and disciplines is 
relatively simple to accomplish, void, of course, of territorial, jurisdictional, cross-
discipline, organizational culture, and personality issues. One of the difficulties is that it 
requires a paradigm shift for many involved. For instance, law enforcement traditionally 
acts primarily on criminal intelligence which is focused on investigation for apprehension 
and prosecution. While this is certainly a critical factor in the war on terrorism, it is not 
the only vital component to consider. The creation and maintenance of the overall picture 
of vulnerability, risk, criticality and threat, through the combining of criminal and 
strategic intelligence, is like putting a jigsaw puzzle together without knowing what the 
end picture is supposed to look like. The results will rarely be immediate. Bits and pieces 
of information (from all perspectives) are most often retrieved and shared one small piece 
at a time. This is not an exact science and therefore, unlike strictly criminal intelligence, 
the process does not produce actionable intelligence at the same rate. Sometimes it just 
results in more information. It is important for each of the participant components of the 
TEW to understand this aspect of the model so they do not have unreasonable 
expectations of its purpose or become disenchanted because there may be no immediate 
results or return on their investment.    
It is essential however, to stay informed and current with all available 
information, especially focusing on any indications of potential impact to the region. In 
order to understand the importance of keeping pace with an ongoing situational 
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awareness, it is helpful to be familiar with a theory related to the speed of the decision 
cycle. This is particularly significant if a response to a perceived threat or actual attack 
becomes necessary. Boyd’s Cycle is a series of “time competitive, Observation-
Orientation-Decision-Action (OODA) cycles,” (Heal 2000, 73) that exist during conflict.9 
It starts with an observation of the status of the adversary and self, and then looks at the 
perspective of the overall situation (orientation). From this information a decision is 
made which “takes into account all of the factors present at the time of the orientation” 
(Heal 2000, 74). The last phase is to carry out the decision by taking action. The cycle 
then repeats itself throughout an incident as circumstances evolve. The opponent who can 
go through the cycle fastest gains the tactical or strategic advantage. Without having 
adequate and current information, it is difficult to make an informed decision in a time of 
conflict.    
This knowledge can prove to be crucial when incident commanders are provided 
with actionable intelligence because they will recognize what they have and be prepared 
to take quick and appropriate action. Otherwise, they will always trail the tempo of the 
adversary and be forced to start from the beginning in each episode of conflict.  
The TEW is exceptional at monitoring all aspects of global information relative to 
terrorism, and functioning as the focal point for fusion and sharing of information for the 
Los Angeles region. It is especially effective during the operational net assessment mode 
in linking real-time information with strategy and emergency response. Because of its 
capacity to maintain a constant situational awareness, the ability to prevent, mitigate, 
disrupt or respond to threats and acts of terrorism is enhanced.  
 
 
9 The OODA Loop is a creation of Colonel John Boyd, USAF (Ret).  
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V. THE LOGIC MODEL APPLIED TO THE COMPONENTS OF 
THE TEW 
Now that the TEW model has been explained in detail, a comprehensive look at 
each of its cells will depict how the logic model has been applied in order to illustrate the 
process and the intended results. In essence, this is a detailed look at the components of 
the system, and establishment of the network on which the formation of the TEW was 
based.10  
 
A. OFFICER IN CHARGE (OIC) CELL 
It is the ultimate goal of this cell to ensure that the TEW provides effective on-
going decision support (information) to agency executives, incident commander(s) (in the 
event of an actual incident) and other users. In other words, an information fusion process 
which results in actionable intelligence to address all phases of the terrorist threat. The 
International Association of Chief’s of Police (IACP) addressed this issue, saying that 
prevention is paramount in any homeland security strategy. However, “to date the vast 
majority of federal homeland security efforts have focused on increasing our national 
capabilities to respond to and recover from a terrorist attack” (IACP 2005, 3). While the 
shift from response to prevention has been long in coming in the national strategy, the 
TEW was founded on this premise. It is the responsibility of the OIC cell to ensure that 
prevention remains the primary goal. 
The OIC Cell (Figure 4) coordinates the overall TEW process with input from 
agency executives and incident commander(s), to determine their (commander’s) intent 
and any specific standing intelligence requirements they may have. This includes any 
public order issues that arise, as well as the ongoing duty to report critical information if 
it is determined that a threat exists which would require input from the executives to 
establish specific requirements. A Commander’s Critical Intelligence Requirement 
(CCIR), and Requests for Information (RFI), would also be considered as input to the 
OIC Cell that starts the intelligence process. This might come in the form of a question 
such as, is there a threat to the Tournament of Roses Parade?  
 
10 Lt. John Sullivan in a series of discussions with author from January - July 2005, unpublished data. 
It is the responsibility of the OIC to articulate the commander’s intent and adjust 
the process and organization as needed to meet any specific situation. The middle 
managers from the primary agencies that staff this function are to stimulate problem 
solving and monitor intelligence dynamics to prevent mirror imaging,11 group thinking or 
tunnel vision. They are tasked with assuring quality control and obtaining final approval 
of the results produced for dissemination in the process phase.  
 
Figure 4.   Officer in Charge Cell 
 
 
B. ANALYSIS SYNTHESIS CELL 
This cell is the focal point for coordination of information and interaction with all 
of the other cells of the TEW. It takes input from all available sources, including the 
OIC’s intent and tasking, leads, reports and RFIs, classified and Open Source Intelligence 
(OSINT) and inputs from other cells and TEWs. All of the information is prioritized as 
Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR), Other Intelligence Requirements (OIR) or 
Specific Intelligence Requirements (SIR).  
                                                 
11 Mirror imaging in intelligence analysis is to believe that an adversary thinks the same way as you or 
your group. 
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The process consists of OSINT exploitation, vetting and validating leads, tasking 
other cells with specific requirements, and a net assessment or evaluation of the results 
(synthesis). It is responsible for monitoring of trends and potential activities that provide 
indications of what, where, when and how a terrorist incident may occur, and issuing the 
appropriate notification (outputs) in the form of advisories, alerts or warnings. This is 
known in the intelligence community as Indications and Warning (I&W). One of the 
most important aspects of this process is the fusion of Operational Intelligence (OPINT), 
the everyday information from the field or world around us that has been analyzed, and 
Criminal Intelligence (CRMINT), the information specific to criminal investigations. It 
also combines strategic and tactical information in order to provide a complete threat 
picture (Figure 5). 
 
Figure 5.   Intelligence Fusion 
 
The blending or fusion of all these diverse aspects in the synthesis phase of the 
TEW process is the significant factor that separates the TEW model from other 
intelligence fusion operations that rely only on criminal information and intelligence as 
indicators of potential terrorist intentions or activities. This bridges the operational net 
assessment process with the Indications and Warning (I&W) function. The final outcome 
of this effort results in the ability to identify trends and potentials, capabilities and 
intentions of an adversary and a complete situational awareness within the TEW. The 
activities and expected results of the Analysis/Synthesis Cell are depicted in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6.   Analysis/Synthesis Cell 
 
 
C. CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT CELL 
The Consequence Management Cell (Figure 7) is staffed primarily by fire and 
EMS personnel. In addition to their disciplinary requirements on operational issues, they 
are responsible for coordinating the fire and EMS component of the TLO program. 
Once all of the pertinent information is obtained, this cell is responsible for the 
development (pre-event) and use (trans- and post-event) of playbooks and Response 
Information Folders (RIF).12 The playbooks contain information for responding to 
specific classes and types of threats, including chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear 
and explosive (CBRNE). The standardized Response Information Folders include terrain 
awareness tools such as location maps, lists of resources and available infrastructure for 
dealing with an attack on a specific site or system. The combination of these two, along 
with real-time information, are contained in a Mission Folder which provides crises 
                                                 
12 Response Information Folders (RIF) were originally identified as target folders. The nomenclature 
was changed due to the negative connotation of “target” to many commercial establishments. 
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management plans and recommended responses (course of action). The Mission Folder is 
a unique situation specific tool that gives timely guidance to an incident commander 
during an actual event.  
This cell provides context to the other cells (output) to understand the potential 
impact of the myriad types of potential terrorist attacks. It also forecasts and documents 
what is needed (logistics) and who is appropriate and capable of handling the job. While 
infrastructure protection is commonly focused on vulnerability and criticality (impact) 
assessment, it must also be linked with knowledge of what the threat is in order to get a 
complete picture of the risk and potential terrorist targeting. Understanding 
vulnerabilities and potential target sites is the part of the overall intelligence picture that 
is provided by the Consequence Management Cell. This is one component of the process 
of integrating the inputs and products of the entire TEW intelligence process, which is 
known as “Intelligence Preparation for Operations” (IPO). The end result is a thorough 
understanding of what might be faced, what is needed to handle the situation and what 
changes might be needed to meet new demands. 
 
 
Figure 7.   Consequence Management Cell 
 
D. INVESTIGATIVE LIAISON CELL 
This cell (Figure 8) coordinates the law TLO component and manages the 
integration of the overall TLO and ILO private sector programs. The personnel assigned 
to this function are responsible for source development, nurturing relationships and 
maintaining ongoing liaison with all information sources and investigative agencies to 
access criminal intelligence.  
Sensitive (classified) information is provided (output) directly to the OIC as 
appropriate for situational awareness and decision support. Feedback (result of input) is 
communicated back to the investigative partners. This cell also imparts the criminal 
context to the other cells, and relates a cumulative picture of individual (criminal) actions 
to the overall situation and their link to ongoing criminal conspiracies or social 
movements. One example is showing the relationship between what appears to be 
isolated criminal acts, such as trademark violations and counterfeiting, and providing 
financial support to known terrorist groups.  
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The end goal (outcome) of this cell is to establish and communicate the link 
between criminal activity and investigations and the TEW process, or the CRIMINT 
component as previously depicted in Figure 5.  
 
Figure 8.   Investigative Liaison Cell 
 
 
E. EPIDEMIOLOGICAL INTELLIGENCE CELL 
The EPI Intel Cell (Figure 9) is staffed by public health and EMS medical staff.13 
They monitor epidemiological information from a wide range of medical, agricultural, 
veterinary and other open sources (inputs). This cell is also responsible for coordination 
of the health TLO program. 
By exploring all available medical and public health information, personnel in this 
cell will be able to project the sequence, potential impact, necessary resources and the 
best course of action to recommend to the incident commander(s). In the event that a bio-
attack occurs, the first signs of its existence would most likely be discovered through this 
process.  
                                                 
13 The EPI Intel Cell EMS staff is comprised of medical personnel (nurses and MDs) as opposed to the 
first responder EMS (fire personnel) that staff the Consequence Management Cell.  
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Figure 9.   Epidemiological Intelligence Cell 
 
F. FORENSIC INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT CELL 
The FIS Cell (figure 10) obtains its data (input) from technical means such as 
video, overhead and aerial images (geospatial intelligence), meteorological (weather) 
data, advanced computer tools (cyber intelligence) and detectors and sensors (e.g. 
dosimeters and radiological pagers) to determine the presence of CBRN substances. Its 
personnel exploit this data (process) to infuse the information into the TEW intelligence 
process in order to better understand and quantify technical aspects of what is occurring. 
They convert highly technical information and data into understandable terms, and 
determine the potential impact of what might happen, which facilitates course of action 
development. A great deal of technical knowledge is required, hence the need for virtual 
reachback to subject matter experts, who would not likely be on staff.  
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This practice results in the translation of complex technical data into graphic 
products (output) for easy understanding of a situation in order to facilitate decision 
making. This may include bar graphs, plume modeling and visual maps with multiple 
layers of data.  
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VI. PERFORMANCE MEASURES OF THE TEW MODEL 
With a thorough understanding of the system’s components, the following 
information will apply the logic model to the overall process of intelligence fusion and 
analysis. It will describe how the TEW model functions as a networked operation, and 
establish standards and metrics to assess the system’s capability. This will also 
demonstrate how it incorporates the “Best” or “Smart Practice” attributes of intelligence 
fusion operations as required in HSPD 8 and the Interim National Preparedness Goal. 
 
A. THE TEW INTELLIGENCE PROCESS  
The TEW provides a system for fusing information from multiple disciplines and 
sources through all phases of an event to determine the overall picture (i.e. all-source-all-
phase fusion).The process (Figure 11) starts with input of raw data (not assessed) and 
information requirements from the multi-disciplinary decision and policy makers. They 
determine what information is critical and necessary in order to formulate appropriate 
decisions for the circumstances. Requirements will change through different phases of an 
event. For example, in the prevention mode, this may include general questions such as: 
Do we face the threat of terrorism in the United States or in our region, and what can be 
done about it? The answer may then lead to the next question: Do we need to expand our 
anti-terrorism effort over the next five years? The nature of these questions will be more 
specific when an event is eminent or has already occurred. 
The process phase can be described as an analysis that can determine an 
indication of what, when, how or where terrorist activity may occur, and produce the 
appropriate warning (Indications and Warning, I&W). This “operational net assessment” 
provides all of the information that is known at a given point in time and that is related to 
a threat and our capacity to deal with it.  
The vast amount of incoming data must first be examined for its validity. 
Individual actions that could signify criminal or terrorist activity (transactions) and 
actions consistent with terrorist Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) should be 
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identified (signature).14 Analysts should also be looking for any patterns of activity 
occurring over time that appear as developing or existing trends. From this information it 
is possible to forecast potential terrorist actions (trends and potentials). It is also 
important to gauge the adversary’s capability of carrying out any threat and to determine 
what the intention or objective may be.  
Another component of the process phase is the assessment of threat, vulnerability 
and criticality, which is equivalent to the level of risk to the geographic area of operation. 
Using all of the information available, an assessment is then conducted from a multi-
disciplinary perspective, in order to match the risk with local capabilities.  
Decision support products (output) in the form of briefings, advisories, alerts and 
warnings, in addition to the mission folders which include Response Information Folders 
and playbooks, are provided as situation awareness tools for decision makers and field 
operations personnel. In the event of a terrorist attack, a common operating picture of 
what is actually happening (in real-time) at the location(s) of the incidents facilitates the 
development of appropriate courses of action. In other words, this provides the 
information to describe the existing situation with recommendations of what to do about 
it.  
The ability to anticipate emerging or current threats and provide effective decision 
support through actionable intelligence (that has been disseminated to the end user) are 
the desired outcome of the TEW process. The systematic analysis from a multi-
disciplinary perspective for all phases of terrorism is what sets the TEW model apart 
from other intelligence fusion operations. The impact of this practice results in the 
effective prevention, mitigation, disruption, response and recovery to threats and acts of 
terrorism.15   
   
 
14 An explanation of the terms transaction and signature as depicted in Figure 11.  
15 Lt. John Sullivan in a series of discussions with author from January - July 2005, unpublished data. 
 
Figure 11.   The TEW Process Model 
   
B. THE PRIMARY EXAMPLE – 2000 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL 
CONVENTION 
Since its inception in 1996, the TEW has participated in numerous training and 
exercise drills which include internal programs, the annual Los Angeles County-wide 
exercise and the National Westwind 99 exercise.16 In addition, the TEW was 
instrumental in the efficient handling of the anthrax hoaxes that occurred in Los Angeles 
in 1998 and again in 2001. This was the subject of Congressional testimony before the 
House Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on Government Efficiency, 
                                                 
16 Westwind 99 simulated a chemical attack on a local air show by a fictional domestic terrorist group, 
resulting in the simulated deaths of 2,000 victims. The exercise encompassed the pre-investigation phase, 
detecting the possibility of a terrorist attack, a comprehensive consequence management response, an 
investigative response, and culminated in the arrest of the perpetrators.  
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Financial Management and Intergovernmental Relations, by the Assistant Director in 
Charge of the Los Angeles Division FBI, in which he stated (in part):  
The effectiveness of the TEW was put to the test during the last quarter of 
1998, when the Southern California region experienced over 40 anthrax 
hoax threats. Early in that period, those incidents garnered a high level of 
media attention and incurred a cost to the public averaging $600,000 per 
response. By the end of that period, the participating agencies had cut 
response costs dramatically, lowered the media profile, and reduced the 
unnecessary decontamination of victims. Both the events of September 
11th and the actual dissemination of anthrax spores that took place shortly 
thereafter, resulted in the handling of several hundred anthrax-related calls 
and incidents by the FBILA and its regional partners. The preceding years 
of interagency cooperation had already established the basis for consistent 
protocols in the handling of anthrax-related calls by the TEW member 
agencies bearing that responsibility. (Iden 2002)  
In the 1998 anthrax hoaxes, the TEW demonstrated its ability to anticipate threats, 
recognize real-time information and coordinate the development and implementation of 
long-term policy and training needs. As incidents began to occur in Wichita, Kansas and 
to move across the country, the TEW identified the anthrax trend, which activated pre-
planning efforts for addressing similar potential incidents in the Los Angeles region. 
After discussions on the issue among the TEW members at their monthly meetings, from 
August – December, an advisory was formulated entitled Responding to Potential 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and Anthrax Threat Incidents. This was 
disseminated to all of the field units of the participating law enforcement, fire and health 
agencies in the region.  
In December 1998, after seven incidents occurred in the area in only 10 days, 
representatives of the six primary agencies17 met to develop formal policy and 
procedures. The outcome was a structured set of indicators that provided the means to 
assess the need to respond, or not, and that resulted in the conservation of vital resources 
and funds. Within hours of the meeting, interdepartmental bulletins were issued defining 
protocol, polices and procedures for handling anthrax-related calls (Gilmore Commission 
2000). 
 
17 LASD, LAPD, LAFD, LACoFD, L.A. Co Department of Health Services (DHS) and the FBI. 
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When the anthrax hoaxes again surfaced in 2001, the primary TEW participants, 
with the addition of representatives from the police and fire departments from the 
independent cities, assembled to update the protocol, which had not been changed since 
its inception in 1998. The revised document was widely distributed to all of the public 
safety agencies and hospitals in the county.  
The most comprehensive example of an activation of the TEW for an actual 
operation is the Democratic National Convention (DNC) which was held in Los Angeles, 
California from August 7 – 18, 2000. During this short period the TEW demonstrated its 
capability to integrate field intelligence from multiple sources to form an overall 
countywide picture. It provided an intelligence fusion system that integrated criminal and 
operational intelligence with emergency management practices across jurisdictional lines. 
For the purpose of this paper, the DNC will serve as a proxy for evaluation, since 
a major terrorist incident has not occurred in Los Angeles. It was a comprehensive event 
that replicated many of the same tasks that would be necessary to deal with a complex 
terrorist incident, and that required the same kind of information collection, processing 
and decision support that would be essential in the event of a terrorist incident in 
Southern California.  
The Democratic National Convention, held at the Staples Center in downtown 
Los Angeles, expected to draw 5,000 delegates and nearly 20,000 media personnel. Due 
to its significance and participation by the President of the United States and numerous 
elected and high ranking government officials, it was designated as a National Security 
Special Event (NSSE).18 The Los Angeles Police and Fire Departments were the agencies 
with primary responsibility for the law enforcement, fire suppression, hazardous 
materials and EMS response.  
In addition to the DNC, the Reform Party’s National Convention was also held 
during this period (August 10 – 13, 2000) at the convention center in the City of Long 
Beach, which is also within the County of Los Angeles Operational Area. The Long 
 
18 A National Special Security Event (NSSE) requires the U.S. Secret Service to assume the role as the 
lead agency for the design and implementation of the operational security plan (PDD-62 1998). 
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Beach Police and Fire Departments had the same primary responsibilities as those 
mentioned for the DNC in the City of Los Angeles.  
Because of the large number of individuals attending the conventions, delegates 
and dignitaries were housed in locations throughout the county area. Local police, fire 
and EMS were the primary agencies responsible for the sites and for managing any 
incidents that occurred within their jurisdictions. The Los Angeles County Sheriff’s 
Department had responsibility for coordinating law enforcement mutual aid in the event 
that additional resources became necessary to respond to any unusual occurrence or civil 
disorder. According to the state’s Standardized Emergency Management System 
(SEMS), any requests for assistance necessary beyond the L.A. Operational Area were to 
be routed through the County Emergency Operations Center (CEOC) to the California 
State Office of Emergency Services (OES).  
A wide variety of groups had indicated their intent to protest during the 
convention on both national and international controversial causes. A number of the 
groups and individual participants, who had recently been involved in unlawful 
demonstrations at events in Canada, Seattle and Washington D.C., were expected to be in 
Los Angeles. They would undoubtedly take full advantage of the opportunity for 
exposure that would be afforded through the extensive media coverage of these events. 
Their actions would potentially include mass disruption through the use of 
unconventional tactics and weapons, mostly directed at law enforcement, at multiple 
locations and jurisdictions throughout the county. Another concern was the possibility of 
hoax attacks, which could be equally disruptive and taxing to available resources.   
The mission of the TEW was to monitor and assess all events throughout the 
county that could have the potential to impact public order or the special events 
themselves. While other agencies were concerned only with the venues and problems 
posed by events in their jurisdiction, the TEW was observing and evaluating the bigger 
picture to identify trends, potentials and indicators of what, where and how acts of 
disruption might occur. This afforded the necessary information to assess the overall 
situation in order to match the risk with local capabilities, and act to prevent, mitigate, 
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disrupt or coordinate a response if necessary. The TEW also acted as a clearinghouse for 
vetting incidents and investigative leads, as well as a central operation for rumor control. 
At the same time, the LAPD maintained an intelligence operations center to 
support its mobile field forces. The United States Secret Service (USSS) activated a Multi 
Agency Coordination Center (MACC), and the FBI operated a Joint Operations Center 
(JOC). All of these efforts continued for the duration of the DNC, and were primarily 
focused on tactical issues. The TEW took a more strategic approach by monitoring all of 
the activities in the entire county operational area and assessing whether they posed a 
threat to the main event. This was accomplished by receiving inputs from the other 
intelligence centers, Mobile Field Forces (MFF), patrol units, fire units, sensitive 
(classified) reporting, open source information and mass media. This data was then 
analyzed according to the TEW process, turned into such products as briefings for 
command staff and advisories on TTPs which were issued to field personnel from all of 
the participating agencies including the LASD (MFF and jail teams), FBI, LAPD, USSS, 
CHP and L.A. City Fire. 
The value of the TEW was demonstrated on numerous occasions during this 
period. As an example, an incident occurred that was first believed to be an intentional 
contamination of fuel that had been delivered to multiple law enforcement agencies, 
disabling numerous police cars and motorcycles. After a thorough investigation by a 
combination of multiple TEW cells and testing of the substance by the Forensic 
Intelligence Support element, it was determined that a trailer containing waste oil had 
accidentally been mixed with gasoline and then dispatched by the oil company. The 
driver, who had been arrested, was subsequently released once the facts were determined. 
The next example depicts how the TEW process functioned from input to impact 
for a particular situation. The TEW received information (input) that law enforcement 
officers patrolling the neighborhood adjacent to the Staples Center found several piles of 
large rocks that had been carefully placed near trees marked with red paint. Apparently 
the protestors planned to use the rocks against law enforcement during the 
demonstrations, and the red marks were pre-placed so the protestors could easily locate 
the rocks. This information and all other similar data about protestor’s tactics that had 
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been obtained by the TEW was assessed (process), and turned into an advisory (output) 
issued to all law enforcement patrol units and MFFs on the demonstrators tactics. As a 
result of the advisory, the protestors were essentially disarmed (outcome) and this type of 
attack was no longer available to the adversary (impact). These are only two of many 
such incidents that were processed by the TEW, which essentially took raw information 
and produced actionable intelligence. The result was that all field forces were afforded 
the ability to act on data that they otherwise may not have known.  
Depending upon the nature of a particular threat or incident, there may be 
occasion when individual TEW cells do not appear to have active participation in the 
process. As an example, although there were no biological or public health issues that 
surfaced during this operational period, the Epidemiological Intelligence Cell maintained 
contact with the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) and conducted enhanced disease 
surveillance for early detection of any unusual occurrence or outbreak. Similarly, there 
was a continual evaluation for chemical, biological or radiological substances, as well as 
the development of response requirements to deal with their consequences.  
In other words, the entire TEW organization actively participated in the process 
so that all aspects of the event were considered in order to maintain a current situational 
awareness and the ability to act and respond appropriately.  
The purpose of this paper up until this point has been to describe how the TEW’s 
concept could be applied to the adapted version of the Program Logic Model. The 
example of the DNC activation now provides an opportunity to assess the TEW’s 
application for actual performance, according to the same measures of the logic model. 
The intent is to determine if the logic model works for this application, and if the TEW is 
effective based on this criterion. It will both describe and measure its performance and 
ability to meet its intended goals under actual conditions (Figure 12). It should be noted 
here that because of the sensitive nature of some information, specific details will 
intentionally be withheld. 
As previously described, the evaluation process of the logic model begins with 
inputs, which in the case of the TEW includes the intelligence requirements as delineated 
by the incident commander. The objective of the member agencies during the operational 
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period of the DNC was to utilize the TEW fusion model to collect and analyze all 
available information, provide comprehensive situational awareness, produce actionable 
intelligence, and develop course of action recommendations across jurisdictional lines for 
all participating agencies and disciplines.19 Other inputs consisted of information 
obtained from advanced technology, such as chemical, biological and radiological 
detection devices, visualization tools (geospatial mapping), virtual planning software 
(plume modeling), and aircraft (fixed wing and helicopters), which provided aerial 
imagery. The majority of information was obtained from open source intelligence, which 
is available on the Internet and through the mass media. Some intelligence was also 
obtained via sensitive (classified) reporting. Field reconnaissance and observation in the 
form of investigative leads and countywide incident reporting from the myriad of law 
enforcement and fire agencies in the field was also a major source. The key information 
obtained included the number of demonstrators, their movement or activity, their 
location(s), who they were or what group they may have been associated with, when the 
information was received (currency), and what special equipment or weapons they 
possessed. This information, regardless of the source, was recorded in a SALUTE20 
report that provided a uniform format for analysis of the groups’ Tactics, Techniques and 
Procedures (TTP). In the case of the DNC for instance, participants included known 
militant groups such as “Anarchists” and “Black Block,” which are prone to violent 
tactics against law enforcement.  
The process consisted of continuously integrating all inputs to analyze the TTPs 
of those who intended to disrupt the event(s). Again, in the case of the DNC, the analysis 
looked at the adversary’s vulnerabilities, crowd movement, formation, leadership and 
other indications that might reveal intentions or specific tactics. This phase also included 
a continual analysis of all available information collected from all sources throughout the 
county for indications of potential impact to the event(s).  
 
19 The principal participating agencies were, LASD, LAPD, LAFD, LACoFD, L.A. Co Department of 
Health Services (DHS), FBILA, LBPD and as needed to all other law enforcement and fire departments in 
the L.A. Operational Area that could be activated under mutual aid agreements.  
20 SALUTE stands for the categories of the report to record and evaluate the Size, Activity, Location, 
Uniform, Time and Equipment of each lead or incident. 
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As a result of processing the available intelligence, a series of TEW advisories 
(outputs) on TTPs were produced in real-time and issued directly to the field 
commanders from the several participating agencies. These described potential issues 
with logistics, special weapons, mass arrest, counter law enforcement operations and 
disruptive techniques. For example, field forces and mobile booking teams were advised 
to be alert that protestors intended to use super glue on their hands to impede the booking 
process and obscure their fingerprints. Potential course of action recommendations for 
prevention, resolution and disruption of the specific situations were also included. In 
addition, current intelligence reports/summaries and a complete Mission Folder 
containing playbooks and a digital Response Information Folder for the Staples Center 
were provided to the primary agencies.21 This effort was undertaken to augment the 
information included in the original operations plans of the various agencies. It provided 
an ongoing understanding of an evolving and dynamic situation and changing threat 
potential. Because the plans developed by the LAPD, FBI and USSS were specifically for 
the NSSE venue, the TEW was the only entity to consider other areas of interest in the 
county, and to analyze the tactics of the opposing force, develop potential courses of 
action for future operations, and evaluate overhead imagery from outside the primary 
event. The TEW was the only overarching organization that worked to integrate all of the 
efforts into one common operational picture.  
The primary outcome achieved from the implementation of the TEW process 
during this event was that public safety participants and policy and decision makers had a 
comprehensive understanding and common operating picture of the existing situation. 
They had the ability to quickly determine the most viable course of action for the given 
circumstances. Because field commanders knew what to expect from the hard-core 
demonstrators at the convention site, they were able to readily identify negative actions 
and intervene accordingly to diminish the capability of the “Anarchists.” Public order and 
safety was maintained and the convention proceedings were not disrupted. The public 
was protected and lawful citizens were able to participate in peaceful demonstrations.   
 
21 This digital version of the RIF for Staples Center (not included in original operations plans) was 
developed by the TEW, in collaboration with the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, and shared 
with the primary agencies which included the LAPD, FBI and USSS.  
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The impact realized from the joint effort influenced by the TEW process was that 
civil disobedience was prevented from occurring, and the right to free speech was 
protected. Ultimately, the preservation of the political process was achieved without 
incident.  
In addition to validating the TEW process according to the Program Logic Model, 
the anthrax and DNC examples are intended to demonstrate the existence of a structure 
for effective information sharing in the Los Angeles region. While numerous 
investigative leads and smaller incidents have been dealt with since then, no other event 
had the complexity to drive all of the elements of the TEW process. Although the 
majority of these lesser incidents did not provide a great deal of actionable information, 
some definitely attracted our attention. For example, in testimony given before the Senate 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, it was stated that in many 
of the Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) crimes committed in Los Angeles, “There are 
mounting indicators of the involvement of terrorist groups and their supporters” 
(Stedman 2005). Specific examples of evidence were provided confirming that these high 
profit-generating crimes were committed by supporters of known terrorist groups or by 
those who had connections to them. At one crime scene, deputies observed numerous 
Hezbollah flags and a photo of its leader, Hassan Nasrallah. In another case, one of the 
suspects taken into custody displayed a tattoo of the Hezbollah flag on his arm. This type 
of information provides input to the TEW process for strategic analysis as well as 
actionable criminal information for the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF). 
While the TEW provides the organization to integrate efforts and fuse data, it is 
not the one decisive factor in achieving the goal of preventing terrorism. Many other 
agencies are linked to the TEW operation, which forms the local network structure that is 
essential for the co-production of intelligence. The advantage of this strategy is that not 
every node of the network needs to be equal in size to add value, it is only important that 
each is connected to the system to make it whole. The significance of the TEW is that 
absent its functioning as the initiator and coordinator of this network, this integration 
would not likely occur.  
    
 







VII. SUMMARY / CONCLUSION 
A. SUMMARY 
Although efforts toward prevention are difficult to measure in any program, input 
and outcome are assessable. The purpose of measuring the performance of the TEW 
using the Program Logic Model was to conduct a self-assessment of its ability to meet its 
intended goals. The evaluation was not meant to be a comparison against other 
information sharing and intelligence fusion center operations, or to make a determination 
of which is better or “best.” It did, however, verify that the TEW program successfully 
meets its intended goals and objectives of being the focal point at the operational level for 
effectively analyzing the strategic and operational information needed to combat 
terrorism and protect critical infrastructure. One of its most significant merits is that it 
reaches beyond the one dimensional aspect of criminal intelligence to include the 
operational considerations of all jurisdictions, levels and disciplines. The effectiveness of 
the TEW model was then evaluated by applying the logic model through a retrospective 
look at its performance during an actual event as represented by the 2000 Democratic 
National Convention. The results showed that the process was also effective when 
utilized in real-time situations and not just when evaluated conceptually.   
The initial intent of this thesis was to validate the TEW as a “best practice.” 
However, lacking official requirements or standards, it is virtually impossible to 
determine what a “best practice” actually looks like or how to measure its performance. 
At any rate, we should not be competing amongst ourselves to see who is “best” when 
our ultimate goal is to collectively be smarter and faster than our adversary. It was 
discovered that a more realistic approach considers what constitutes a “smart practice,” 
because “it has something worth analyzing that is applicable to the problem at hand” 
(Bardach 2000, 71).  
The solution to achieving effective intelligence sharing for homeland security lies 
beyond merely placing representatives from different agencies (and sometimes 
disciplines) together in facilities across the nation and calling them “fusion centers.” 
There must be a standardized system to effectively process information across 
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jurisdictional and disciplinary boundaries, like the organizational structure illustrated in 
the DNC example, and that can be replicated in each of these centers. They should then 
be linked to one another, forming the type of network that is necessary to defend against 
an agile enemy. The need for this structure can not be underestimated. It is essential to 
our national security because we have learned that, “…whoever masters the network 
form stands to gain the advantage” (Ronfeldt and Arquilla 2001). 
In his paper on Measuring Prevention, Woodbury makes several points that are 
pertinent to this study. For instance, he says, “Defining the ‘what’ to measure is where we 
are challenged” (Woodbury 2005). Because it is often difficult to show results for 
prevention efforts, final outcomes may not always be the best way to measure 
effectiveness. “The process and systems that lead to preferred outcomes [emphasis mine] 
are measured when ultimate outcome measurement is impossible.” (Woodbury 2005). 
The existence of a collaborative system that “enables and promotes the integration and 
analysis of data from all sources” is in itself a form of measurement. Accordingly, four 
measurable desired outcomes or goals for an organizational effort to prevent terrorist 
attacks can be based on the following: (Woodbury 2005) 
• Increased ability to identify indications of an existing or 
future threat. 
• Increased ability to evaluate the potential of threats as they 
are identified. 
• Reduced vulnerability of critical infrastructures and other 
potential targets. 
• Increased appropriateness of protection and/or other threat 
response activities. 
Based on these criteria, not just perception or peer approval, it would be 
reasonable to conclude that the TEW is in fact a “smart practice.” It meets its intended 
goals and objectives when measured according to the parameters of the Program Logic 
Model, and it contains the “process and systems that lead to preferred outcomes.” In 
addition, the TEW model addresses the following target capabilities which are listed as 
desired traits in the National Preparedness Guidance section of HSPD 8:  
- Information Collection and Threat Detection  
- Intelligence Fusion and Analysis    
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- Information Sharing and Collaboration   
- Terrorism Investigation and Apprehension   
- CBRNE Detection       
- Risk Analysis 
- Critical Infrastructure Protection 
- Food/Agriculture Safety and Defense 
- Public Health Epidemiological Investigation and Testing 
The venture to create a compatible national homeland security intelligence 
network, based on the TEW model, has already been initiated by the Los Angeles 
Sheriff’s Department. This effort has been supported by the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security’s Office for Domestic Preparedness (ODP) through the establishment 
of the National TEW Resource Center in Los Angeles. The TEW Expansion Program 
provides technical assistance and training, as well as expansion workshops for the 
prospective jurisdictions, and technical assistance and training on TEW practice” 
(Sullivan 2005, 4). The goal of this program is to expand the TEW model to at least 51 
major urban areas across the nation.  
Because the TEW model has essentially established practical standards for 
intelligence fusion center operations, which includes all of the appropriate disciplines and 
jurisdictions that need access to information, the duplication of effort and regional centers 
acting independently without connectivity to the larger network can be avoided. The 
2003 GAO report, Homeland Security: Efforts to Improve Information Sharing Need to 
be Strengthened, cites these points as essential in order to achieve a well coordinated 
national homeland security network.  
 
B. RECOMMENDATION FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
There is still much to be learned in this emerging field of intelligence for local 
public safety agencies. This research has validated the effectiveness of the TEW to meet 
its goals and objectives at the local level, and has become a benchmark of measurable 
attributes for the assessment of like programs. Further research is necessary to determine 
how to actually develop the network to repeat L.A.’s success in individual nodes and then 
apply the concept across the entire network. Once this is underway, the same 
performance measures should be applied to the additional TEW operations as they come 
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on line. This will be necessary to determine if they are also achieving their intended 
goals, and that the process remains consistent with the other nodes of the emerging 
network. The same measures should later be applied to the overall distributed national 
network in order to measure its effectiveness and capacity for the co-production of 
intelligence.  
A final thought: When the Joint Regional Intelligence Center (JRIC) matures into 
an all-crimes analysis operation, will the intelligence process implemented by the TEW 
prove to be as effective when applied to threats other than international and domestic 
terrorism? Could this particular system possibly lead to a more efficient way to enhance 
the safety and security of our neighborhoods in dealing with crime prevention and law 
enforcement issues such as the terror caused by gang violence? 
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